

least because of the emphasis on the international aspect of scholarship and philosophy against the disease of nationalism. The "Tübingen Manifesto" closes the volume. In it, the participants in the Symposium plead for peace, against racial and/or religious discrimination and against all forms of colonialism.

Dr. Adolfo Murguía, Tübingen

SIEMEK, MAREK J.

The Idea of Transcendentalism in Fichte and Kant

[*"Die Idee des Transzendentalismus bei Fichte und Kant"*]

(*Schriften zur Transzendentalphilosophie, Bd. 4*)

Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag; XI, 192 pp.

One essential aim of Siemek's book is to destroy the current notion that between Fichte's Science of Knowledge and the works of the early Kantians a continuous link exists as regards approach and the problems addressed. This notion, which has been expressed by thinkers such as J. E. Erdmann, K. Fischer, W. Windelband, and to a certain degree even by Cassirer and Gueroult, and which states that Fichte's theory can be "derived" from the work of the Kantians, is called "genetic deception" by Siemek (p. 65). The author upholds the thesis that Fichte was the first person to grasp the full implications of Kant's "revolutionary" new philosophical approach, while it was missed by the early Kantians (Siemek refers especially to Reinhold, Maimon, and Beck) (p. IX f.).

In the first part of his book Siemek follows T. S. Kuhn's model of theoretical change (p. 17 n. 6) in describing Kant's critique of reason as the establishing of a new paradigm. The paradigm rendered obsolete by Kant is constituted by the classical theory of knowledge, whose theoretical "basic formula" presents the definition of truth as *adaequatio rei et intellectus* (p. 4). This formula describes the cognitive form of a direct reproduction of reality by the consciousness, a "simple episteme", which is why Siemek calls the theoretical field of classical epistemology the epistemic field (p. 4). In Siemek's view this paradigm underwent an "intellectual crisis" in the eighteenth century. Kant grasped that it was not possible to weather this crisis within the old theoretical field, but that rather the epistemic field must itself become the object of theory (p. 17 ff.). Thus Kant's new position is termed an epistemological perspective by the author (p. 19). As Siemek recounts in the last section of the first part of his book, the early Kantians failed to understand Kant's idea of transcendentalism as the establishing of a new theoretical level, but instead adopted Kant's epistemological approach on the foundation of the old, epistemic field (p. 45).

In the second part of his book the author brings out in great detail the differences which in his opinion exist between Fichte's reception of Kant and that of the early Kantians. Above all he emphasizes that Fichte not only read Kant in a manner different from the Kantians, but also that he read another Kant: Fichte accepted the implications of all three critical works of Kant, while the first Kantians concentrated on the "Critique of Pure Reason" (p. 75; cf. p. 2).

In the third and final part of his book Siemek presents the basic features of Fichte's notion of critique of reason. That Fichte also wished to provide critical philosophy with a "first principle" could initially point to a close relationship to Reinhold, Maimon, and Beck – but it is precisely this viewpoint that involves (according to Siemek) the above-mentioned genetic deception. For though Fichte also inquired after a first principle, he was inquiring after a principle of the entire philosophy, one which had to precede the separation into theoretical and practical philosophy and first account for this (p. 117). In the early Kantians, however, the first principle served all the time only to establish the theoretical area, alongside which the practical area remains secondary (pp. 66, 116). By contrast Fichte took up Kant's idea of transcendentalism and at the same time consistently took it beyond the "letter" of Kant's philosophy: his theme is the unity of knowing and acting (pp. 66, 114; cf. pp. 158 f.). By the very fact that Fichte's Science of Knowledge understood Kant's change of paradigm as change of paradigm, as thematization of the possibility-conditions of the simple episteme, it was only consistent for his theory to examine the "existence of knowledge" *tout court*; in this sense Fichte's Science of Knowledge represents an ontological theory of knowledge (pp. 115, 182).

Siemek's is a very stimulating book; its clearly formulated theses enhance its general structure. It is above all his remarks on tackling Fichte's philosophy that would seem to offer a very promising "version" of the Science of Knowledge. The present reviewer does, however, find the analysis of the works of the early Kantians wanting. Siemek's thesis that Reinhold, Maimon, and Beck completely misunderstood the real impulse motivating Kant would have needed more detailed substantiation – all the more so when one bears in mind that Kant himself bore testimony e.g. to the depth of Salomon Maimon's understanding of the critique of reason (in a letter to Herz of 26 May 1789). While Siemek's insistence on an essential difference between Fichte and the first Kantians would appear plausible, one might well suppose, however, that this difference does not rest on Fichte being the first to understand Kant (even though this remark of the author's only takes up Fichte's own assertion on this score; cf. pp. 126 f.).

Achim Engstler, M.A., Münster